Compatibilism and Free Belief

被引：10

作者：

Booth, Anthony R. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Utrecht, NL-3508 TC Utrecht, Netherlands

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS | 2009年 / 38卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1080/05568640902933379

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p. In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.

引用

页码：1 / 12

页数：12

共 8 条

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[5]

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[7]

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