The problem of uptake

To perform an illocutionary act - e.g. to apologise - is it necessary, sufficient, or irrelevant that a hearer understand you to be performing that act? This issue is sometimes called the 'problem of uptake'. Famously, Austin's inaugural account makes uptake necessary for illocutionary force. For decades, critics have objected to this view: Some have sought to show that uptake is irrelevant; others have argued that uptake is important though not essential; while still others have argued that uptake is necessary though must be radically reframed. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that there is a problem of uptake in Austin. In this paper, I contend that this view is wrong. Austinian uptake, I argue, is essential; yet, contra the standard reading, it is not synonymous with understanding. Uptake is a narrow criterion pertaining to conventional-linguistic competencies, which rules out specific kinds of misunderstanding, not misunderstanding uberhaupt. The importation of non-Austinian assumptions about uptake from subsequent speech act theorists - specifically, the mis-equivocation of uptake with understanding a speaker's intention - I show, has muddied the water. This paper offers a novel reconsideration and salvaging of uptake and its significance, whose stakes I elucidate through intervention in the fraught issue of conceptualising sexual consent.