WHY "GOOD" FIRMS DO BAD THINGS: THE EFFECTS OF HIGH ASPIRATIONS, HIGH EXPECTATIONS, AND PROMINENCE ON THE INCIDENCE OF CORPORATE ILLEGALITY

被引：405

作者：

Mishina, Yuri ^{[1
]}

Dykes, Bernadine J. ^{[2
]}

Block, Emily S. ^{[3
]}

Pollock, Timothy G. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Michigan State Univ, Eli Broad Coll Business, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

[2] Univ Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Newark, DE 19716 USA

[3] Univ Notre Dame, Mendoza Coll Business, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA

[4] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2010年 / 53卷 / 04期

关键词：

MULTIPLE IMPUTATION; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION; LEVEL ADAPTATION; PROSPECT-THEORY; MISSING VALUES; MARKET; RISK; ATTRIBUTIONS; PERFORMANCE;

D O I：

10.5465/AMJ.2010.52814578

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Recent high-profile corporate scandals involving prominent, high-performing firms cast doubt on assertions that the costs of getting caught decrease the likelihood such high performers will act illegally. We explain this paradox by using theories of loss aversion and hubris to examine a sample of S&P 500 manufacturers. Results demonstrate that both performance above internal aspirations and performance above external expectations increase the likelihood of illegal activities. The sample firms' prominence enhanced the effects of performance above expectations on the likelihood of illegal actions. Prominent and less prominent firms displayed different patterns of behavior when their performance failed to meet aspirations.

引用

页码：701 / 722

页数：22

共 119 条

[1] THE GLORIED SELF - THE AGGRANDIZEMENT AND THE CONSTRICTION OF SELF [J].