On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations

被引：16

作者：

Hehenkamp, Burkhard ^{[1
]}

Possajennikov, Alex ^{[2
]}

Guse, Tobias ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Dortmund, Dept Econ & Social Sci, D-44221 Dortmund, Germany

[2] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2010年 / 73卷 / 02期

关键词：

Nash equilibrium; Evolutionary stability; Finite populations; STABILITY; PRICE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：254 / 258

页数：5

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