Fiscal policy in unionized labor markets

被引:37
作者
Ardagna, Silvia [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Littauer Ctr, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
fiscal policy; unions; macroeconomic and distributional effects;
D O I
10.1016/j.jedc.2006.05.009
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity, public finances, welfare, and income distribution in a dynamic general equilibrium model with a unionized labor market. The paper shows that debt-financed increases of public employment, wages of public sector employees, unemployment benefits, and labor taxes put pressure on unions' wage claims, leading to higher private sector wages, lower employment, capital, and output. In addition, increases of public employment, public wages and unemployment benefits increase workers' utility relative to the pre-policy change equilibrium during the transition, but not in the long-run. Instead, workers' utility decreases at any time horizon when labor taxes increase. Capitalists always benefit from increases in taxes on labor but their welfare decreases when public spending goes up. Finally, the paper investigates the extent to which the way the government balances its budget affects these results. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1498 / 1534
页数:37
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