GROUP AND DYADIC COMMUNICATION IN TRUST GAMES

被引:6
作者
Lev-On, Azi [1 ]
Chavez, Alex [2 ]
Bicchieri, Cristina [3 ]
机构
[1] Ariel Univ Ctr, Sch Commun, IL-40700 Ariel, Israel
[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Psychol, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[3] Univ Penn, Dept Philosophy, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
communication; computer-mediated cooperation; communication laboratory experiments; trust;
D O I
10.1177/1043463109337100
中图分类号
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号
030301 ; 1204 ;
摘要
We study the behavioral consequences of interpersonal communication prior to experimental Trust games. We manipulated the richness of the communication medium and the size of the communicating group. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments, but the size of the communicating group did: The amounts sent were significantly higher in the dyadic communication conditions than in the group communication and no-communication conditions. We also found that first-movers' expectations of secondmovers' reciprocation strongly predicted their levels of investment.
引用
收藏
页码:37 / 54
页数:18
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