Servicers and Mortgage-Backed Securities Default: Theory and Evidence

被引：20

作者：

Ambrose, Brent W. ^{[1
]}

Sanders, Anthony B. ^{[2
]}

Yavas, Abdullah ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[2] George Mason Univ, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

[3] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA

来源：

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 44卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1540-6229.12099

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study conflicting incentives of the master and special servicers in handling troubled loans in a Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities deal and how the frictions between the interests of the two servicers might be diminished if the master and special servicing rights are held by the same firm. We show that concentrating both servicing rights in one firm reduces the likelihood that a defaulted loan terminates in foreclosure.

引用

页码：462 / 489

页数：28

共 21 条

[1]

Adelino Manuel, 2009, 094 FED RES BANK BOS, V3

[2]

Allison PD., 2010, Survival Analysis Using SAS: A Practical Guide, V2nd ed.

[3] Commercial mortgage-backed securities: Prepayment and default [J].