Does PCAOB inspection access improve audit quality? An examination of foreign firms listed in the United States

被引:143
作者
Lamoreaux, Phillip T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Arizona State Univ, WP Carey Sch Business, BA 297C POB 873606, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA
关键词
PCAOB; Audit regulation; Audit quality; Going concern; Internal control weakness; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INTERNAL CONTROL; EARNINGS; IRREGULARITIES; DETERMINANTS; CREDIBILITY; ENVIRONMENT; MANAGEMENT; SOX;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.02.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
To gain insight into the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) auditor inspection program, I examine the association between the PCAOB's access to inspect auditors of foreign SEC registrants and audit quality. Although the PCAOB is mandated to inspect all auditors of SEC registrants, certain foreign governments prohibit PCAOB inspections of their domestic auditors, providing variation in PCAOB inspection access that is not available when studying a sample of US companies. I find that auditors subject to PCAOB inspection access provide higher quality audits as measured by more going concern opinions, more reported material weaknesses, and less earnings management, relative to auditors not subject to PCAOB inspection access. There is no observable difference between the two sets of auditors prior to the PCAOB inspection regime. The positive effect of PCAOB inspection access on audit quality is observed in jurisdictions with, and without, a local audit regulator. Overall, the results are consistent with PCAOB inspection access being positively associated with audit quality (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:313 / 337
页数:25
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