Client Deadline Concentration in Audit Offices and Audit Quality

被引:35
|
作者
Czerney, Keith [1 ]
Jang, Daun [2 ]
Omer, Thomas C. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
[2] Calif State Univ Sacramento, Sacramento, CA 95819 USA
[3] Univ Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68583 USA
来源
AUDITING-A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORY | 2019年 / 38卷 / 04期
关键词
audit quality; deadline concentration; audit offices; BIG; 4; NONAUDIT SERVICES; TIME PRESSURE; EARNINGS; SIZE; MANAGEMENT; INSIGHTS;
D O I
10.2308/ajpt-52386
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This research investigates the effect on audit quality of concentrated public company financial statement filing deadlines in audit offices. Audit offices must effectively manage their resources to meet clients' audit service requirements. When an audit office has deadlines that are more concentrated in time, effective resource management is of greater importance to reduce the likelihood of audit failure. Drawing on relevant research from the auditing and management literatures, we hypothesize and find that audit quality is lower when an audit office's clients' financial statement deadlines concentrate in time, which we term client deadline concentration. The significant, negative effect of client deadline concentration on audit quality is incremental to the effects of other resource-based constraints from the prior literature and to controls for unobservable differences in audit offices that explain a significant amount of the variation in audit quality outcomes.
引用
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页码:55 / 75
页数:21
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