How I Really Say What You Think

被引:0
|
作者
Manuel Viejo, Jose [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Autonoma Madrid, Dept Linguist Gen Lenguas Modernas Log & Filosofi, Fac Filosofia & Letras, Crta Colmenar,Km 15, E-28049 Madrid, Spain
来源
AXIOMATHES | 2021年 / 31卷 / 03期
关键词
Belief ascription; Harmony; Indexical theory; Object-dependent thought; Opacity; Referentialism; Semantic innocence; That-clauses; Translational theory; ATTITUDES DE-DICTO; BELIEF; RUSSELLIANISM;
D O I
10.1007/s10516-019-09459-6
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The apparently obviously true doctrine of opacity has been thought to be inconsistent with two others, to which many philosophers of language are also attracted: the referentialist account of the semantics of proper names and indexicals, on the one hand, and the principle of semantic innocence, on the other. I discuss here one of the most popular strategies for resolving the apparent inconsistency, namely Mark Richard's theory of belief ascriptions, and raise three problems for it. Finally, I propose an alternative theory of the semantics of belief-ascribing sentences that clearly avoids the three problems that trouble Richard's theory, and advocate it as the best available strategy for resolving the apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of opacity, referentialism, and the principle of semantic innocence.
引用
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页码:251 / 277
页数:27
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