Surrogation Fundamentals: Measurement and Cognition

被引:6
作者
Black, Paul W. [1 ]
Meservy, Thomas O. [2 ]
Tayler, William B. [3 ]
Williams, Jeffrey O. [4 ]
机构
[1] Auburn Univ, Harbert Coll Business, Sch Accountancy, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
[2] Brigham Young Univ, Marriott Sch Business, Dept Informat Syst, Provo, UT USA
[3] Brigham Young Univ, Marriott Sch Business, Dept Accountancy, Provo, UT USA
[4] Utah Valley Univ, Woodbury Sch Business, Dept Accounting, Orem, UT USA
关键词
surrogation; measurement; strategy; attribute substitution; performance evaluation; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; TRADE-OFF; PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION; JUDGMENT; METRICS; IMPACT; DONT;
D O I
10.2308/JMAR-2020-071
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Measurement is a fundamental part of accounting. A primary purpose of measurement is to provide more concrete representations of abstract strategic objectives. A potential consequence of using measures to proxy for less-tangible strategic constructs is the tendency for managers to fall prey to surrogation, losing sight of strategic constructs and behaving as though measures are the constructs of interest. We show that surrogation is a nonconscious process. We also extend understanding of the conditions necessary for surrogation to occur by showing that mere awareness of measurement (even absent compensation) is sufficient to induce surrogation. These findings have implications for any setting where measures are used to represent a more abstract construct. While using measures is clearly very beneficial, we highlight the importance of understanding when and why surrogation can occur and developing strategies to reduce its effects.
引用
收藏
页码:9 / 29
页数:21
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