Heads I win, tails you lose: Asymmetric taxes, risk taking, and innovation

被引：5

作者：

Albertus, James F. ^{[1
]}

Glover, Brent ^{[1
]}

Levine, Oliver ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, 5000 Forbes Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA

[2] Univ Wisconsin Madison, Finance Dept, 975 Univ Ave, Madison, WI 53706 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2019年 / 105卷

关键词：

Corporate risk taking; Multinational corporations; Transfer pricing; Taxation; Profit shifting; Tax avoidance; R&D; Intellectual property; Corporate investment; MULTINATIONAL FIRMS; INCOME; AVOIDANCE; DETERMINANTS; HAVENS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.04.010

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

When multinationals face lower tax rates abroad than in the US, transfer pricing strategies generate an asymmetry in the tax rates on a project's profits and losses. We show that the tax savings from transfer pricing can be expressed as a long position in a call option. We use a model to show that this transfer pricing call option leads a firm to choose riskier and larger projects than it would otherwise. Thus, transfer pricing strategies do not simply reduce a firm's taxes, they can influence the scale and types of projects undertaken. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：24 / 40

页数：17