Standing in a Crowded Room: Exploring the Relation between Interest Group System Density and Access to Policymakers

被引:24
作者
Hanegraaff, Marcel [1 ]
van der Ploeg, Jens [2 ]
Berkhout, Joost [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Univ Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
interest groups; civil society and voluntary groups; comparative politics; European politics; lobbying; POPULATION ECOLOGY; ORGANIZED INTERESTS; LESBIAN RIGHTS; UNITED-STATES; MOBILIZATION; NICHE; REPRESENTATION; LEGISLATORS; ENGAGEMENT; BREADTH;
D O I
10.1177/1065912919865938
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The numerous presence of interest groups may be a recipe for policy deadlock or, more optimistically, indicate the vibrancy of a political community. Population-ecology theory suggests that the number of interest groups active in a policy domain is relevant for strategies and political outcomes, such as policy access, and interest group density is expected to reduce access for individual organizations. Competitive pressures in dense domains necessitate groups to specialize to gain access to the policy access. We empirically assess this argument and indeed find lower levels of access in denser policy fields, moderated by specialization of organizations in lobbying. Furthermore, we identify important differences between mature (the Netherlands and Belgium) and young (Slovenia and Lithuania) interest group systems. These findings address theoretical concerns about the lack of linkages between micro- and macro-studies on interest representation.
引用
收藏
页码:51 / 64
页数:14
相关论文
共 58 条
[1]   THE ROLE OF LOBBYISTS - ENTREPRENEURS WITH 2 AUDIENCES [J].
AINSWORTH, S ;
SENED, I .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1993, 37 (03) :834-866
[2]   The role of legislators in the determination of interest group influence [J].
Ainsworth, SH .
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 1997, 22 (04) :517-533
[3]   POLITICAL DESIGN AND REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS [J].
ANDERSON, CW .
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 1977, 10 (01) :127-152
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1965, LOGIC COLLECTIVE ACT
[5]  
[Anonymous], 1998, BASIC INTERESTS IMPO, DOI DOI 10.1515/9781400822485
[6]   CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACCESS [J].
AUSTENSMITH, D .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1995, 89 (03) :566-581
[7]  
Bauer Raymond., 1963, AM BUSINESS PUBLIC P
[8]  
Baumgartner FR, 2015, INTEREST GROUP ADVOC, P203
[9]   Making Inference across Mobilisation and Influence Research: Comparing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Mapping of Interest Systems [J].
Berkhout, Joost ;
Beyers, Jan ;
Braun, Caelesta ;
Hanegraaff, Marcel ;
Lowery, David .
POLITICAL STUDIES, 2018, 66 (01) :43-62
[10]  
Berkhout J, 2013, INTEREST GROUPS ADVO, V2, P227, DOI 10.1057/iga.2013.6