On creating worlds without evil - given divine counterfactual knowledge

被引:6
作者
Rasmussen, J
机构
[1] Glendale, AZ 85306
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S0034412504007255
中图分类号
B9 [宗教];
学科分类号
010107 ;
摘要
An important question raised in the Molinist debate is, 'Given God's access to counterfactual knowledge, could God create a world in which free creatures always refrain from evil?' An affirmative answer suggests that God cannot possess counterfactual knowledge since such knowledge would allow God to create seemingly more desirable worlds than the actual world. However, Alvin Plantinga has argued that it is at least possible that every possible person is transworld depraved - meaning that each person would perform some wrong actions if any world in which that person is morally free were actualized. I argue that, given an infinite number of possible persons, the probability that everyone is transworld depraved is exceedingly low. In addition, I investigate whether there are enough possible persons vis-A-vis the number of moral choices per person so that God could create worlds like the actual world, except lacking in moral evil.
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页码:457 / 470
页数:14
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