Self-selection in tournaments: The case of chess players

被引:10
作者
Linnemer, Laurent [1 ]
Visser, Michael [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] CREST LEI, 15 Bd Gabriel Peri, F-92245 Malakoff, France
[2] Univ Paris 02, CREST LEI, F-75231 Paris 05, France
[3] Univ Paris 02, CRED, F-75231 Paris 05, France
关键词
Chess; Prizes; Relative performance; Selection; Sorting; Tournament; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should increase with the player's observed strength, and the total awarded prize amount. Furthermore, under certain conditions self-selection implies that participants with high observed strength levels have smaller expected strength-shocks than those with low levels. Consequently, the latter should play better than predicted and the former worse (given their observed strength). These predictions are confronted with data from a large and high-prize chess tournament held in the USA. This tournament is divided into different sections, with players being able to play in the section to which their current chess rating (observed strength) belongs. As predicted, we find that within each section the participation probability increases with chess rating and prize amounts, and players with a relatively low (resp. high) rating are indeed the ones who have a better (resp. worse) relative performance. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:213 / 234
页数:22
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