Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting

被引：24
作者：
Battaglini, Marco [1 ]
机构：
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2007年 / 60卷 / 02期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
contract theory; dynamic contracts; renegotiation;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.007
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal-agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent; and the distortion induced by the renegotiation-proofness constraint is non-decreasing in the persistence of types. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：213 / 246
页数：34
相关论文
共 21 条
[1]  
Baron D. P., 1984, INFORMATION EC POLIC, V1, P267, DOI DOI 10.1016/0167-6245(84)90006-4
[2]   Long-term contracting with Markovian consumers [J].
Battaglini, M .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (03) :637-658
[3]  
BATTAGLINI M, 2006, PARETO EFFICIENT INC
[4]   Durable-goods monopoly with stochastic values [J].
Biehl, AR .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 32 (03) :565-577
[5]  
Blume A, 1998, J ECON MANAGE STRAT, V7, P397
[6]   Sequential screening [J].
Courty, P ;
Li, H .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2000, 67 (04) :697-717
[7]   RENEGOTIATION AND INFORMATION REVELATION OVER TIME - THE CASE OF OPTIMAL LABOR CONTRACTS [J].
DEWATRIPONT, M .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1989, 104 (03) :589-619
[8]   CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION AND COASIAN DYNAMICS [J].
HART, OD ;
TIROLE, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1988, 55 (04) :509-540
[9]   Efficient sorting in a dynamic adverse-selection model [J].
Hendel, I ;
Lizzeri, A ;
Siniscalchi, M .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2005, 72 (02) :467-497
[10]   The role of leasing under adverse selection [J].
Hendel, I ;
Lizzeri, A .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2002, 110 (01) :113-143
123