Executive pay dispersion: Reconciling the differing effects of pay inequality and pay inequity on firm performance

被引：9

作者：

Li, Zonghui ^{[1
]}

Daspit, Joshua J. ^{[2
]}

Marler, Laura E. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Jacksonville Univ, Davis Coll Business, 2800 Univ Blvd North, Jacksonville, FL 32211 USA

[2] Texas State Univ, McCoy Coll Business, Dept Management, San Marcos, TX USA

[3] Mississippi State Univ, Coll Business, Mississippi State, MS USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT | 2022年 / 33卷 / 15期

关键词：

Pay dispersion; top management team; executives; pay inequality; pay inequity; temporality; performance; CEO PAY; TOURNAMENT THEORY; WAGE DISPERSION; SOCIAL-CONTEXT; UPPER ECHELONS; SHORT-TERMISM; PANEL-DATA; COMPENSATION; TURNOVER; RESOURCE;

D O I：

10.1080/09585192.2021.1925324

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Debate persists regarding the effects of executive pay dispersion on firm performance given that conflicting findings have plagued the literature. We aim to reconcile previous inconsistencies by taking a more nuanced approach and exploring the effects of explained and unexplained executive pay dispersion on the firm's short- and long-term performance. Using a longitudinal sample of public firms over a 12-year period, we find that unexplained pay dispersion among executives-indicating pay inequity-negatively affects short-term firm performance while explained pay dispersion-indicating pay inequality-positively affects long-term firm performance. The findings help resolve prior inconsistencies associated with understanding the relationship between executive pay dispersion and firm performance. Accordingly, we advance research by demonstrating the importance of measuring pay dispersion types and accounting for the temporal nature of firm performance.

引用

页码：3056 / 3084

页数：29

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