The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds

被引:227
作者
Crane, Alan D. [1 ]
Michenaud, Sebastien [2 ]
Weston, James P. [1 ]
机构
[1] Rice Univ, Houston, TX 77251 USA
[2] Depaul Univ, Chicago, IL 60604 USA
关键词
REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DIVIDEND POLICY; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; ANALYST COVERAGE; AGENCY COSTS; MUTUAL FUNDS; INFORMATION; EARNINGS; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhw012
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our estimates indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in institutional ownership causes a $7 million (8%) increase in dividends. We also find differences in shareholder proposals and voting patterns that suggest that even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring firm behavior. The effect of institutional ownership on dividends is stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs.
引用
收藏
页码:1377 / 1408
页数:32
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