The spatial ultimatum game

被引:140
作者
Page, KM
Nowak, MA
Sigmund, K
机构
[1] Inst Adv Study, Princeton, NJ 08540 USA
[2] Univ Vienna, Inst Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
[3] Int Inst Appl Syst Anal, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
关键词
evolution; fairness; rationality; game theory; spatial dynamics;
D O I
10.1098/rspb.2000.1266
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In the ultimatum game, two players are asked to split a certain sum of money. The proposer has to make an offer. If the responder accepts the offer, the money will be shared accordingly. If the responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing. The rational solution is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share, and for the responder to accept it. Human players, in contrast, usually prefer fair splits. In this paper, we use evolutionary game theory to analyse the ultimatum game. We first show that in a nonspatial setting, natural selection chooses the unfair, rational solution. In a spatial setting, however, much fairer outcomes evolve.
引用
收藏
页码:2177 / 2182
页数:6
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