Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination

被引:15
作者
Dugar, Subhasish [1 ]
Shahriar, Quazi [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utah, Dept Econ, 332 S 1400 E,Bldg 73,Room 222, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
[2] San Diego State Univ, Dept Econ, 5550 Campanile Dr, San Diego, CA 92182 USA
关键词
Coordination game; Cheap-talk; Laboratory experiment; STAG-HUNT GAMES; PLAYERS MODELS; RISK DOMINANCE; COMMUNICATION; BEHAVIOR; PROMISES; EQUILIBRIUM; INCENTIVES; COLLUSION; COGNITION;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper is the first to compare the efficiency-enhancing capacity of two communication protocols in experimental stag-hunt games. The traditional restricted protocol that allows communicating intentions only fails to improve efficiency over the no-communication conditions. When players are allowed to send any messages (free-form), the majority of them send messages that underscore a reason for which players should choose the efficient action. To explore further whether the absence of such a richer message in the traditional restricted communication protocol can be the cause of its ineffectiveness, we ran an additional treatment that included the intention-based message as well as a reason based message. The data show that the richer restricted communication is as effective as free-form communication, and that reason-based messages are an effective efficiency enhancing device in this class of coordination games regardless of whether the protocol is restricted or free-form. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:294 / 310
页数:17
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