Compensating for Executive Compensation: The Case for Gatekeeper Incentive Pay

被引:1
作者
Hannes, Sharon [1 ]
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Fac Law, Tel Aviv, Israel
关键词
STOCK; PRICES; COSTS;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:385 / 437
页数:53
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