Less is more: Consumer education in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing*,**

Different stakeholders are educating consumers about the benefits of remanufacturing. By increasing the number of consumers who are willing to purchase remanufactured products, consumer education has been expected to facilitate the advancement of the remanufacturing sector. We formally validate the con-dition under which consumer education is indeed beneficial from a social planner's perspective. We de-velop a game-theoretical model to examine the implications of consumer education upon a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier. The manufacturer can perform remanu-facturing at the component level. The direct effect of consumer education is that more consumers are willing to pay for the remanufactured product. Although the optimal remanufactured product quantity, in general, increases in the presence of consumer education, surprisingly, our analysis identifies a con -sumer education paradox, that is, as more consumers are willing to pay for the remanufactured product, the manufacturer switches the choice from remanufacturing to no remanufacturing. Moreover, consumer education could be detrimental to the supply chain, consumers, and the environment because of the paradox. Fortunately, temperate consumer education might be all-around desirable if and only if ex-ante few consumers are willing to purchase remanufactured products; that is, from the social planner's per-spective, temperate consumer education should be conducted to foster the remanufacturing sector in its infancy. (c) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. ABSTRACT Different stakeholders are educating consumers about the benefits of remanufacturing. By increasing the number of consumers who are willing to purchase remanufactured products, consumer education has been expected to facilitate the advancement of the remanufacturing sector. We formally validate the con-dition under which consumer education is indeed beneficial from a social planner's perspective. We de-velop a game-theoretical model to examine the implications of consumer education upon a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier. The manufacturer can perform remanu-facturing at the component level. The direct effect of consumer education is that more consumers are willing to pay for the remanufactured product. Although the optimal remanufactured product quantity, in general, increases in the presence of consumer education, surprisingly, our analysis identifies a con -sumer education paradox, that is, as more consumers are willing to pay for the remanufactured product, the manufacturer switches the choice from remanufacturing to no remanufacturing. Moreover, consumer education could be detrimental to the supply chain, consumers, and the environment because of the paradox. Fortunately, temperate consumer education might be all-around desirable if and only if ex-ante few consumers are willing to purchase remanufactured products; that is, from the social planner's per-spective, temperate consumer education should be conducted to foster the remanufacturing sector in its infancy. (c) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.