Decentralization of the firm: theory and evidence

被引:105
作者
Christie, AA [1 ]
Joye, MP
Watts, RL
机构
[1] Louisiana State Univ, Coll Business Adm, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
[2] UBS, Private Banking, Zurich, Switzerland
[3] Univ Rochester, William E Simon Grad Sch Business Adm, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
decentralization; organization design; decision rights;
D O I
10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00036-0
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Value maximization requires either that knowledge is transferred to those with the right to make decisions, or that decision rights are transferred to those who have the knowledge. A tradeoff of knowledge transfer costs and control costs is required. Characteristics of firms' investment opportunity sets (IOSs) that affect knowledge transfer costs and control costs are identified. Testable predictions about the relations between these characteristics and firms' decentralization decisions are developed and tested. The evidence presented is consistent with our predictions and is robust to different ways of measuring variables. (C) 2001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 36
页数:34
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