Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers

被引：6

作者：

Cocchiaro, Mariangela Zoe ^{[1
,2
]}

Frances, Bryan ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] Univ Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

[3] Univ Tartu, Inst Philosophy & Semiot, Tartu, Estonia

来源：

TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY | 2021年 / 40卷 / 05期

关键词：

Peer disagreement; Peerhood; Aumann; Polemarchakis & Geneakoplos; Economics; Agree to disagree; Epistemic position; Ordinary disagreements; DISAGREEMENT;

D O I：

10.1007/s11245-019-09678-x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P. However, epistemologists have overlooked a key realistic way how epistemic peers can, or even have to, differ epistemically-a way that reveals the inadequacy of both conformist and non-conformist views on peer disagreement by uncovering how the causes of peer disagreement bear on the debate's core philosophical issue. Part of our argument for this thesis will involve giving a thorough yet entirely informal presentation of mathematical theorems in economics by Robert Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236-1239,1976) and Polemarchakis and Geneakoplos (J Econ Theory 26:363-390,1982) which represent a formally precise description of how two rational agents must deal with disagreement under certain epistemically interesting circumstances.

引用

页码：1063 / 1073

页数：11

共 15 条

[1] AGREEING TO DISAGREE [J].