Evolutionary games;
Population dynamics;
Equilibrium convergence;
Control strategies;
LOTKA-VOLTERRA EQUATION;
REPLICATOR DYNAMICS;
STABLE STRATEGIES;
RESPONSE DYNAMICS;
POPULATION GAMES;
FICTITIOUS PLAY;
SNOWDRIFT GAMES;
CONTINUOUS-TIME;
NETWORKS;
CONVERGENCE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.arcontrol.2018.04.010
中图分类号:
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号:
0812 ;
摘要:
In support of the growing interest in how to efficiently influence complex systems of interacting self interested agents, we present this review of fundamental concepts, emerging research, and open problems related to the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix games, with particular emphasis on applications in social, economic, and biological networks. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机构:
Hebei Univ Technol, Sch Sci, Hebei Prov Key Lab Big Data Calculat, Tianjin 300401, Peoples R ChinaHebei Univ Technol, Sch Sci, Hebei Prov Key Lab Big Data Calculat, Tianjin 300401, Peoples R China
Gao, Xiaoye
Wang, Jinhuan
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机构:
Hebei Univ Technol, Sch Sci, Hebei Prov Key Lab Big Data Calculat, Tianjin 300401, Peoples R ChinaHebei Univ Technol, Sch Sci, Hebei Prov Key Lab Big Data Calculat, Tianjin 300401, Peoples R China
Wang, Jinhuan
Yang, Dedong
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h-index: 0
机构:
Hebei Univ Technol, Sch Artificial Intelligence, Tianjin, Peoples R ChinaHebei Univ Technol, Sch Sci, Hebei Prov Key Lab Big Data Calculat, Tianjin 300401, Peoples R China