MORAL HAZARD;
CRISIS;
INVESTMENT;
MANAGEMENT;
DISTRESS;
CRUNCH;
POLICY;
FIRMS;
D O I:
10.1093/rfs/hhaa067
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We analyze the credit supply and real effects of bank bail-ins by exploiting the unexpected failure and subsequent resolution of a major Portuguese bank. Using loan-level data, we show that while firms more exposed to the bail-in suffered a significant contraction of credit at the intensive margin, they were on average able to compensate for the supply-driven shock. However, affected SMEs experienced a binding reduction of funds available through credit lines, and those with lower internal liquidity increased precautionary cash holdings and reduced investment and employment. Our results highlight the trade-off policymakers face when considering this new bank resolution mechanism.