BoMaNet: Boolean Masking of an Entire Neural Network

被引:26
作者
Dubey, Anuj [1 ]
Cammarota, Rosario [2 ]
Aysu, Aydin [1 ]
机构
[1] North Carolina State Univ, Raleigh, NC 27695 USA
[2] Intel Labs, San Diego, CA USA
来源
2020 IEEE/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AIDED-DESIGN (ICCAD) | 2020年
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Masking; neural networks; side-channel attacks; model stealing; SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS; IMPLEMENTATION;
D O I
10.1145/3400302.3415649
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Recent work on stealing machine learning (ML) models from inference engines with physical side-channel attacks warrant an urgent need for effective side-channel defenses. This work proposes the first fully-masked neural network inference engine design. Masking uses secure multi-party computation to split the secrets into random shares and to decorrelate the statistical relation of secret-dependent computations to side-channels (e.g., the power draw). In this work, we construct secure hardware primitives to mask all the linear and non-linear operations in a neural network. We address the challenge of masking integer addition by converting each addition into a sequence of XOR and AND gates and by augmenting Trichina's secure Boolean masking style. We improve the traditional Trichina's AND gates by adding pipelining elements for better glitch-resistance and we architect the whole design to sustain a throughput of 1 masked addition per cycle. We implement the proposed secure inference engine on a Xilinx Spartan-6 (XC6SLX75) FPGA. The results show that masking incurs an overhead of 3.5% in latency and 5.9x in area. Finally, we demonstrate the security of the masked design with 2M traces.
引用
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页数:9
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