Freedom, fiction and evidential decision theory

被引：0

作者：

McKay, Phyllis Kirstin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bristol, Dept Philosophy, Bristol BS8 1TB, Avon, England

来源：

ERKENNTNIS | 2007年 / 66卷 / 03期

关键词：

Migraine; Rational Agent; Decision Theory; Reference Class; Spurious Correlation;

D O I：

10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem - the medical Newcomb problems - don't work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it - Huw Price and CR Hitchcock - clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.

引用

页码：393 / 407

页数：15

共 8 条

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PRICE, H
[J]. BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 1991, 42 (02) : 157 - 176

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