Equity Crowdfunding: High-Quality or Low-Quality Entrepreneurs?

被引:67
作者
Blaseg, Daniel [1 ]
Cumming, Douglas [2 ,3 ]
Koetter, Michael [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ramon Llull, ESADE, Ave Torre Blanca 59, Sant Cugat Del Valles 08172, Spain
[2] Florida Atlantic Univ, Coll Business, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA
[3] Univ Birmingham, Birmingham Business Sch, Birmingham, W Midlands, England
[4] Otto von Guericke Univ, IWH, Deutsch Bundesbank, Halle, Saale, Germany
关键词
adverse selection; pecking order theory; equity crowdfunding; entrepreneurial finance; credit constraints;
D O I
10.1177/1042258719899427
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.
引用
收藏
页码:505 / 530
页数:26
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