Comparing Competition Equilibrium with Nash Equilibrium in Electric Power Market

被引:8
作者
Wang, Haibing [1 ]
Deng, Jian [2 ]
Wang, Chengmin [1 ]
Sun, Weiqing [3 ]
Xie, Ning [1 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Shanghai 200240, Peoples R China
[2] Jilin Univ Finance & Econ, Dept Business Adm, Changchun 130117, Jilin, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Shanghai Sci & Technol, Dept Elect Engn, Shanghai 200093, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Accounting cost pricing; competition equilibrium; marginal cost pricing; market failure; market surplus; Nash equilibrium; power market; LINEAR SUPPLY FUNCTIONS; MODELS; PARAMETERIZATION;
D O I
10.17775/CSEEJPES.2015.01140
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
The Nash equilibrium and competition equilibrium have been widely studied in the electric power market up to now. In this paper, it is explained that the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by using marginal cost pricing and the competition equilibrium can be performed by using accounting cost pricing based on the model of the power market system. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and competition equilibrium indicates that surplus and unfair allocation of market benefits may be obtained by the Nash equilibrium, and the competition equilibrium realizes the optimization in economics with maximum market efficiency and fairness for market benefit allocations while the optimization in mathematics is achieved by the Nash equilibrium. There is sameness between the Nash equilibrium and competition equilibrium at the point when the power network characteristics are disregarded. The case study is made on a IEEE 30-bus system, and the calculation results indicate that it is the key issue to perform the competition equilibrium by using accounting cost pricing.
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 304
页数:6
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