Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords

被引：768

作者：

Edelman, Benjamin ^{[1
]}

Ostrovsky, Michael

Schwarz, Michael

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] Yahoo Res, Berkeley, CA 94704 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2007年 / 97卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.97.1.242

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the "generalized second-price" (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.

引用

页码：242 / 259

页数：18

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