Who provides liquidity, and when?

被引:20
作者
Li, Sida [1 ]
Wang, Xin [2 ]
Ye, Mao [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Gies Coll Business, 340 Wohlers Hall,1206 S 6th St, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Div Banking & Finance, Singapore 639798, Singapore
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, 1050 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
High-frequency trading; Algorithmic trading; Tick size; Liquidity; Bid-ask spread; MARKET; AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.04.020
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We model competition for liquidity provision between high-frequency traders (HFTs) and slower execution algorithms (EAs) designed to minimize investors' transaction costs. Under continuous pricing, EAs dominate liquidity provision by using aggressive limit orders to stimulate HFTs' market orders. Under discrete pricing, HFTs dominate liquidity provision if the bid-ask spread is binding at one tick. If the tick size (minimum price variation) is not binding, EAs choose between stimulating HFTs and providing liquidity to non-HFTs. Transaction costs increase with the tick size but can be negatively correlated with the bid ask spread when all traders can provide liquidity. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:968 / 980
页数:13
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