CEO talent, CEO compensation, and product market competition

被引：30
|
作者：
Jung, Hae Won [1 ]
Subramanian, Ajay [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Melbourne, Dept Finance, Level 12,198 Berkeley St, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
[2] Georgia State Univ, Dept Risk Management & Insurance, J Mack Robinson Coll Business, 35 Broad St, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
[3] Georgia State Univ, Dept Finance, J Mack Robinson Coll Business, 35 Broad St, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 125卷 / 01期
关键词：
CEO talent; CEO pay; Product market competition; Structural estimation; FIRM SIZE; INCENTIVES; TURNOVER; MODEL; PAY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.005
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive chief executive officer (CEO)-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm value. CEO talent matters more in more competitive markets with greater product substitutabilities. Our CEO impact estimates are much higher than those obtained by previous structural approaches that abstract away from CEO market segmentation. The estimates differ across industries primarily due to variation in product market competition, rather than variation in the CEO talent distribution. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：48 / 71
页数：24
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