From Individual to Collective Intentionality

被引：0

作者：

Arruda, Caroline T. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2016年 / 46卷 / 03期

关键词：

collective intentionality; individual intentionality; group agency; group rationality;

D O I：

10.1177/0048393116632685

中图分类号：

B82 [伦理学（道德学）];

学科分类号：

摘要：

A Summary and evaluation of the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks, and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the ongoing debate about collective intentionality and group agency. The individual essays contained therein are considered both from the perspective of how they advance the collection's goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.

引用

页码：318 / 331

页数：14

共 38 条

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