Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the US Federal Government

被引:37
作者
Bolton, Alexander [1 ]
de Figueiredo, John M. [2 ]
Lewis, David E. [3 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA
[3] Vanderbilt Univ, 221 Kirkland Hall, Nashville, TN 37235 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
PUBLIC-SERVICE MOTIVATION; ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE; POLITICAL APPOINTEES; JOB-SATISFACTION; EXECUTIVE BRANCH; CIVIL-SERVICE; UNITED-STATES; INTENTION; RATES; EXIT;
D O I
10.1093/jopart/muaa051
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
A defining feature of public sector employment in the United States is the regular change in elected leadership. We describe how these changes alter policy and disrupt civil servants' influence over agency decisions, potentially shaping their career choices. Using data on careers from over three million federal employees in the United States from 1988 to 2011, we evaluate how administration changes influence turnover in a series of regression analyses. We find substantial stability in the civil service but also some pockets of responsiveness to political factors, particularly among career senior executives in agencies with views divergent from the president's. A combination of factors, including transitions, policy priorities, and ideological differences, could increase turnover propensity for these employees by nearly one-third in some agencies over an administration's first term. This has implications for understanding possible mechanisms linking politics and organizational capacity and for understanding how and for whom politics is influential in career decisions.
引用
收藏
页码:451 / 466
页数:16
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