On the effects of asymmetric and endogenous taxation in experimental public goods games

被引：16
作者：
Sutter, M [1 ]
Weck-Hannemann, H [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Innsbruck, Inst Publ Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2003年 / 79卷 / 01期
关键词：
taxation; public goods; crowding-out; asymmetry; endogeneity;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00288-4
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In our experimental public-goods game, subjects face exogenously or endogenously determined asymmetric minimum contributions. Endogeneity does not affect overall contributions. If asymmetric contribution levels are approved of endogenously, the disadvantaged subjects contribute significantly less than in case of exogenous determination. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：59 / 67
页数：9
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