Asymmetric demand information and channel profits when retailers compete

被引：0

作者：

Xiao, B ^{[1
]}

Lin, L ^{[1
]}

Zhang, AL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tsing Hua Univ, Inst Nucl & New Energy Technol, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China

来源：

SHAPING BUSINESS STRATEGY IN A NETWORKED WORLD, VOLS 1 AND 2, PROCEEDINGS | 2004年

关键词：

supply chain; channels of distribution; game theory;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

We consider a supply chain with a sin le manufacturer selling a single product through two competing retailers. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, and the retailers set the retail margin, simultaneously. The demand information among the members is asymmetric. The main contribution of this paper is extended the results of [5] with two competing retailers under asymmetric demand information. We consider six cases with the manufacturer or the retailers whether owning the information or not, and analyze these six cases in turn solve for a Bayesian equilibrium. Some results are obtained finally.

引用

页码：38 / 40

页数：3

共 7 条

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[5] Channel coordination when retailers compete
Ingene, CA
Parry, ME
[J]. MARKETING SCIENCE, 1995, 14 (04) : 360 - 377
[6] TIROLE J, 1988, THEORY IND ORGANIZAT
[7] WUJIN C, 1997, J RETALING, V73, P487

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