Games with coupled populations: An experiment in continuous time

被引:1
作者
Benndorf, Volker [1 ]
Martinez-Martinez, Ismael [2 ]
Normann, Hans-Theo [2 ]
机构
[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Theodor W Adorno Platz 4, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany
[2] HHU, Dusseldorf Inst Competit Econ DICE, Univ Str 1, D-40225 Dusseldorf, Germany
关键词
Equilibrium selection; Population games; Continuous-time experiment; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES; ANIMAL SOCIETIES; SELF-REGULATION; SOCIAL NORMS; HOLD-UP; EQUILIBRIUM; STABILITY; COMPETITION; BEHAVIOR; FLUCTUATIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2021.105281
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We propose a model of coupled population games where intra-and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2x2 games with coupled replicator dynamics in this framework. Standard one-and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. Building on the theoretical analysis, we run continuous-time laboratory experiments using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are smaller (in absolute terms), play converges to steady states located further from the prediction. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页数:50
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