Monetary and macroprudential policies under rules and discretion

被引：6
|
作者：
Laureys, Lien [1 ]
Meeks, Roland [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Bank England, Threadneedle St, London EC2R 8AH, England
[2] Australian Natl Univ, Ctr Appl Macroecon Anal, Canberra, ACT, Australia
[3] Ctr Macroecon, Canberra, ACT, Australia
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2018年 / 170卷
关键词：
Monetary policy; Macroprudential policy; DSGE models; Nash policy games; INFLATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study the policy design problem faced by central banks with both monetary and macroprudential objectives. We find that a time-consistent policy is preferred to a widely-studied class of simple monetary and macroprudential rules. When interest rates adjust to macroprudential policy in an augmented monetary policy rule, improved outcomes result. When policy authority is split between institutions, strategic interactions between discretionary policymakers can result in notably poor outcomes. (C) 2018 The Bank of England. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：104 / 108
页数：5
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