On the centipede game

被引:65
作者
Aumann, RJ [1 ]
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Inst Math, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Rational & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1997.0605
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In Rosenthal's Centipede Game, if at the start of play it is commonly known that the players will choose rationally at vertices that are actually reached, then the backward induction outcome results; that is, the first player "goes out" at the first move. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 105
页数:9
相关论文
共 4 条
[1]   BACKWARD INDUCTION AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF RATIONALITY [J].
AUMANN, RJ .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1995, 8 (01) :6-19
[2]   A note on backward induction - Reply [J].
Aumann, RJ .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1996, 17 (01) :138-146
[3]   A note on backward induction [J].
Binmore, K .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1996, 17 (01) :135-137
[4]  
ROSENTHAL R, 1982, J ECON THEORY, V25, P92