Opportunistic and deliberate disinflation under imperfect credibility

被引:73
作者
Bomfim, AN [1 ]
Rudebusch, GD [1 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank, San Francisco, CA USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2601179
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
One strategy for disinflation prescribes a deliberate path toward low inflation. A contrasting opportunistic approach eschews deliberate action and instead waits for unforeseen shocks to reduce inflation. This paper compares the ability of these two approaches to achieve disinflation-and at, what cost. We analyze these issues using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model, which allows alternative assumptions to be made about expectations held by agents in the economy; hence, the credibility of the central bank can be considered in assessing the cost of deliberate and opportunistic disinflations.
引用
收藏
页码:707 / 721
页数:15
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