Policy Disruption Through Regulatory Delay in the Trump Administration

被引:16
作者
Thrower, Sharece [1 ]
机构
[1] Vanderbilt Univ, 221 Kirkland Hall, Nashville, TN 37235 USA
关键词
regulations; policy making; delay; bureaucracy; presidency; AGENCIES; DEFERENCE; POLITICS; COURT;
D O I
10.1111/psq.12473
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Newly elected presidents frequently want to repeal previous administrations' policies but face significant legislative and judicial barriers. Alternatively, they can delay the implementation of regulations promulgated by outgoing presidents to stall unfavorable outcomes. This article explores the political and organizational influences behind such delay by examining every economically significant final rule promulgated by the Obama administration during its closing year to answer whether, when, and why it was postponed under Trump. Overall, both factors are important determinants of regulatory delay, yielding mutually reinforcing effects. These findings provide insights into another dimension of presidential influence in the policy-making process, beyond policy creation.
引用
收藏
页码:517 / 536
页数:20
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