Myth or reality? The long-run underperformance of initial public offerings: Evidence from venture and nonventure capital-backed companies

被引:550
作者
Brav, A
Gompers, PA
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA
[2] NBER, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02742.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the long-run underperformance of recent initial public offering (IPO) firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972-1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975-1992. We find that venture-backed IPOs outperform nonventure-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially reduces underperformance for nonventure-backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar size and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs.
引用
收藏
页码:1791 / 1821
页数:31
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