Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform

被引：5

作者：

Brower, Ann L. ^{[1
]}

Meguire, Philip ^{[2
]}

Monks, Adrian ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Lincoln Univ, Lincoln, New Zealand

[2] Univ Canterbury, Dept Econ, Canterbury, New Zealand

[3] Landcare Res, Dundedin, New Zealand

来源：

LAND ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 86卷 / 03期

关键词：

PROPERTY;

D O I：

10.3368/le.86.3.467

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper uses bargaining dynamics, administrative politics, and agency theory to examine financial outcomes from New Zealand land reform. Results are inconsistent with payments arising from a bargain in which both the Crown and lessee advocate to their full potential, and are instead consistent with the Crown backing down to lessees' desires for a generous deal. This back-clown stems either from "bureaucratic coping," or from the addition of a bureaucratic middleman between the Crown principal and its negotiator subagent, exacerbating the principal-agent problem. (JEL K11, Q28)

引用

页码：467 / 492

页数：26

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