Evolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove games

被引:24
作者
Chen, Wei [1 ]
Gracia-Lazaro, Carlos [2 ]
Li, Zhiwu [1 ,3 ]
Wang, Long [4 ]
Moreno, Yamir [2 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Xidian Univ, Sch Electromech Engn, Xian 710071, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Zaragoza, Inst Biocomputat & Phys Complex Syst BIFI, Zaragoza 50018, Spain
[3] Macau Univ Sci & Technol, Inst Syst Engn, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China
[4] Peking Univ, Coll Engn, Ctr Syst & Control, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
[5] Univ Zaragoza, Dept Theoret Phys, Fac Sci, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain
[6] Inst Sci Interchange, Turin, Italy
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
SNOWDRIFT GAMES; COOPERATION;
D O I
10.1038/s41598-017-04284-6
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource often requires the cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of the Hawk-Dove Game for an arbitrary number of agents: the N-person Hawk-Dove Game. In this model, doves exemplify the cooperative behavior without intraspecies conflict, while hawks represent the aggressive behavior. In the absence of hawks, doves share the resource equally and avoid conflict, but having hawks around lead to doves escaping without fighting. Conversely, hawks fight for the resource at the cost of getting injured. Nevertheless, if doves are present in sufficient number to expel the hawks, they can aggregate to protect the resource, and thus avoid being plundered by hawks. We derive and numerically solve an exact equation for the evolution of the system in both finite and infinite well-mixed populations, finding the conditions for stable coexistence between both species. Furthermore, by varying the different parameters, we found a scenario of bifurcations that leads the system from dominating hawks and coexistence to bi-stability, multiple interior equilibria and dominating doves.
引用
收藏
页数:10
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