Why firms form (or do not form) RJVS

被引:52
作者
Roeller, Lars-Hendrik
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Univ Toronto, Mississauga, ON L5L 1C6, Canada
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02069.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this article, we examine why it is difficult to induce firms to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We examine various incentives and disincentives for RJV formation by estimating an endogeneous switching model using data from the US National Cooperative Research Act. The empirical findings support hypotheses that firms of different sizes have disincentives to form RJVs and that cost-sharing is an important incentive for RJV participation.
引用
收藏
页码:1122 / 1144
页数:23
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