Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers

被引:223
作者
Cain, Matthew D. [1 ]
McKeon, Stephen B. [2 ]
Solomon, Steven Davidoff [3 ]
机构
[1] US Secur & Exchange Commiss, Div Econ & Risk Anal, Washington, DC 20549 USA
[2] Univ Oregon, Lundquist Coll Business, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Sch Law, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
Hostile takeovers; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; Law; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; ANTITAKEOVER LEGISLATION; MANAGERIAL PREFERENCES; FIRM VALUE; STATUTES; OWNERSHIP; DEFENSES; MARKET;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a data set of largely exogenous legal changes, we find that certain takeover laws, such as poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:464 / 485
页数:22
相关论文
共 55 条
[1]  
Aranow E., 1977, Development in Tender Offers for Corporate Control: An Updating of a Prior Treatise on the Practical and Legal Problems Involved in Tender Offers
[2]  
Barzuza M., 2010, VA LAW REV, V95, P1973
[3]   What Matters in Corporate Governance? [J].
Bebchuk, Lucian ;
Cohen, Alma ;
Ferrell, Allen .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (02) :783-827
[4]  
Bebchuk LA, 2014, COLUMBIA LAW REV, V114, P1549
[5]   Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Mullainathan, S .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2003, 111 (05) :1043-1075
[6]   Is there discretion in wage setting? a test using takeover legislation [J].
Bertrand, M ;
Mullainathan, S .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1999, 30 (03) :535-U2
[7]  
Bhagal S, 2008, COLUMBIA LAW REV, V108, P1803
[8]   Corporate governance myths: Comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber [J].
Brickley, James A. ;
Zimmerman, Jerold L. .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2010, 50 (2-3) :235-245
[9]  
Bruck Connie., 1988, The Predator's Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and the Rise of the Junk Bond Raiders
[10]  
Catan E., 2014, LAW FINANCE AN UNPUB