A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes

被引:3
作者
Marinc, Matej [1 ,2 ]
Rant, Vasja [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Ljubljana, Fac Econ, Ljubljana 1000, Slovenia
[2] Univ Amsterdam, Fac Econ & Business, ACLE, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
Bank bankruptcy law; Bank insolvency regimes; Bank failures; Optimal resolution; Financial crisis; MORAL HAZARD; FINANCIAL SECTOR; RESOLUTION; RISK; SUPERVISION; FORBEARANCE; FAILURES; LENDER; CRISIS; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfs.2014.06.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article analyzes bank bankruptcy regimes across 142 countries. By employing factor analysis, we identify five main dimensions of bank bankruptcy frameworks: (1) difficulty of forbearance and ease of court appeal, (2) availability of supervisory tools, (3) court involvement, (4) supervisory powers with respect to managers, and (5) supervisory powers with respect to shareholders and preinsolvency phase. We use cluster analysis to identify and group countries according to two prevalent types of bank bankruptcy frameworks: a court-led and administrative bank bankruptcy regime. Administrative bank bankruptcy regimes are associated with less court involvement in the resolution process, less likely forbearance, a higher possibility of court appeal, greater availability of supervisory tools, weaker supervisory powers with respect to managers and stronger supervisory powers with respect to shareholders, and a preinsolvency phase as opposed to the court-led bank bankruptcy regimes. Administrative bank bankruptcy regimes are also associated with fewer creditor rights, less government effectiveness, and lower institutional quality than court-led bank bankruptcy regimes. We find some evidence that the type and main dimensions of a bank bankruptcy regime are related to the occurrence and severity of the global financial crisis. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:134 / 150
页数:17
相关论文
共 75 条
  • [1] Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking
    Acharya, Viral V.
    Amihud, Yakov
    Litov, Lubomir
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 102 (01) : 150 - 166
  • [2] Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity
    Acharya, Viral V.
    Shin, Hyun Song
    Yorulmazer, Tanju
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2011, 24 (06) : 2166 - 2205
  • [3] A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation
    Acharya, Viral V.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, 2009, 5 (03) : 224 - 255
  • [4] Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures
    Acharya, Viral V.
    Yorulmazer, Tanju
    [J]. REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2008, 21 (06) : 2705 - 2742
  • [5] Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy banks
    Ashcraft, AB
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 95 (05) : 1712 - 1730
  • [6] Ayotte Kenneth., 2010, Journal of Corpo- ration Law, V35, P469
  • [7] Barth J. R., 2003, RETHINKING BANK REGU, P2003
  • [8] Barth JR, 2008, COMP ECON STUD, V50, P537, DOI 10.1057/ces.2008.33
  • [9] Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011
    Barth, James R.
    Caprio, Gerard, Jr.
    Levine, Ross
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMIC POLICY, 2013, 5 (02) : 111 - 219
  • [10] Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
    Barth, JR
    Caprio, G
    Levine, R
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2004, 13 (02) : 205 - 248