Buying supermajorities in finite legislatures

被引：32

作者：

Banks, JS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW | 2000年 / 94卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2585839

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal majority and universal coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Synder is incorrect.

引用

页码：677 / 681

页数：5