Bribing in first-price auctions (vol 77, pg 214, 2013)

被引：1
作者：
Kotowski, Maciej H. [1 ]
Rachmilevitch, Shiran [2 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31999 Haifa, Israel
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2014年 / 87卷
关键词：
Bribes; Collusion; First-price auctions;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.008
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：616 / 618
页数：3
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